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I investigate the optimal auditing scheme for a revenue-maximizing tax-collection
agency that observes not only reported prots, but also the level of employment at
each rm. Each rm is owned by a single entrepreneur whose managerial ability is
random. The optimal auditing scheme is discontinuous and non-monotone in ability.
In intermediate audit costs, less-productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities
that increase in ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. I argue that if the
optimal auditing scheme were adopted in practice, net revenue collected from nonfarm
sole proprietors would increase by at least 59 percent.
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11 Introduction
The literature on optimal income tax enforcement has focused mainly on taxpayers whose
income is exogenous or salaried workers.1 However, in the U.S., taxes on wages and salaries
are subject to employer withholding and, thus, almost perfectly enforced. Indeed, Slemrod
[2007] reports that only one percent of wages and salaries are underreported to the tax-
collection agency (henceforth the IRS). In contrast, 43 percent of individual business income
is underreported.2 This evidence suggests that, in order to enforce income taxes, the IRS
should concentrate on developing a better strategy to monitor business proprietors.
This paper asks the following: Given that reported income and a single factor of
production are observable, how should a revenue-maximizing IRS monitor heterogeneous
entrepreneurs? The source of heterogeneity is a random managerial ability, which is private
information. Once the monitoring strategy is conditioned on a single input, the IRS can
indirectly distort production in order to provide incentives, which enriches its set of tools to
enforce self-employment income taxes.
I interpret this single factor of production as labor input. Since wage taxes are almost
perfectly enforced, the number of workers at each rm seems to be easily observable by
the IRS. Using data on entrepreneurship and employment from the U.S., I argue that if
distortions and audits were optimally combined, net revenue collected from nonfarm sole
proprietors would increase by at least 59 percent.
In Section 2, I adapt the two-stage game developed in Bigio and Zilberman [2011] to
study optimal self-employment income tax enforcement. A self-employed individual is a
1The seminal paper is Reinganum and Wilde [1985], inspired by the costly state verication model of
Townsend [1979]. Notable contributions are Border and Sobel [1987], Melumad and Mookherjee [1989],
Mookherjee and Png [1989], Cremer et al. [1990], S anchez and Sobel [1993], Cremer and Gahvari [1996],
Macho-Stadler and P erez-Castrillo [1997], Chander and Wilde [1998], and Bassetto and Phelan [2008]. The
rst theoretical work on tax noncompliance is Allingham and Sandmo [1972], which builds on Becker [1968]'s
work on the economics of crime. Recent surveys are Andreoni et al. [1998], Slemrod and Yitzhaki [2002],
and Sandmo [2005].
2These gures account for ten billion and 109 billion dollars, respectively. Kleven et al. [2011], for
instance, dene tax-evasion rate as the share of reported income that is underreported and calculate it for
Denmark. The tax-evasion rate is 14.9 percent for self-employment income, 1.1 percent for personal income,
41.6 percent for self-reported income, and 0.3 percent for third-party-reported income.
2risk-neutral entrepreneur who owns and manages a single rm. An entrepreneur experiences
a random managerial ability { her privately observed type { that enhances productivity in a
plant exhibiting decreasing returns to scale. Production is carried out by a team of workers.
Entrepreneurs can underreport income { that is, the prots generated by their own rms {
in order to evade taxes. If a rm is audited, true income is uncovered, and the entrepreneur
must pay a penalty.
In the rst stage, given the distribution of managerial ability, the IRS commits to a
costly monitoring strategy, dependent on both reported income and labor input, in order to
maximize net revenue. In the second stage, entrepreneurs take into account this monitoring
strategy and maximize expected prots by choosing labor input and reported income. Hence,
labor is not only a factor of production, but also a signal of true income. At a production
cost, labor can be strategically distorted to signal a lower income to the IRS.
To solve this model, I adopt a mechanism design approach, in which the choice of labor
and reported income are delegated to the IRS, which is the principal. Due to the revelation
principle, it is enough to focus within the class of direct mechanisms that respect incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. That is, an agent reports her type (i.e., her man-
agerial ability) and is then assigned a labor input to employ, an amount to report as prots,
and a probability with which she will be audited. The mechanism is designed such that
agents truthfully report their types and derive at least their reservation values.
The main nding is that the optimal auditing scheme may be non-monotone in ability.
In intermediate audit costs, less-productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that
increase in managerial ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. At some threshold
level of ability, the optimal auditing scheme discontinuously drops.
There are two driving forces behind this non-monotonicity result. The rst is the reser-
vation value, which is type-dependent. Since an entrepreneur can declare her true prots
and pay the right amount of taxes, her reservation value is the post-tax truthfully declared
prots, which is increasing in managerial ability. Hence, entrepreneurs face countervailing
3incentives. On the one hand, an entrepreneur is willing to understate her type in order to
pay less in taxes. On the other hand, she is willing to overstate her type in order to be
assigned a higher reservation value by the principal. Moreover, the incentives to understate
(overstate) are relatively stronger for high-ability (low-ability) types. In this environment, a
non-monotone monitoring strategy may be optimal as long as incentive compatibility is not
violated.
The second driving force is the joint condition of the monitoring strategy on both reported
income and labor input. If it depends only on reported income, this model collapses to a
variant of S anchez and Sobel [1993], in which the optimal monitoring strategy must be non-
increasing in order to not violate incentive compatibility. Every entrepreneur below a certain
threshold type is audited with constant probability, whereas those above it are not monitored
at all. In contrast, if the monitoring strategy depends only on labor input, as in Bigio and
Zilberman [2011], the optimal monitoring strategy is non-decreasing. Those types below a
certain threshold are not monitored at all, whereas those above it are audited with constant
probability. In Sections 3 and 4, I discuss the role of each driving force in detail.
The role of costly audits as a tool to maximize government revenue is twofold: First,
it enforces taxes from those that are audited; second, it provides incentives by preventing
misreport from other types, which allows the IRS to require higher income declarations from
them. Similarly, labor distortions can be used to provide incentives, but only at a production
cost that diminishes revenue collection. The optimal mechanism balances the use of these two
tools in a way that preserves incentive compatibility and maximizes net revenue collection.
The optimal mechanism has the following properties: (1) As in a standard mechanism-
design problem, the top-type is not distorted; (2) in the top range of the type distribution,
audits are never used, and labor is distorted downwards to provide incentives; (3) below some
threshold type, stronger incentives for entrepreneurs to overstate their types and, thus, to be
assigned a higher reservation value limit the further use of distortions to provide incentives;
(4) if the audit cost is too high, only labor distortions are used to provide incentives; (5) if
4the audit cost is not too high, audits and labor distortions are optimally combined to enforce
taxes; in the bottom range of the type distribution, both the optimal monitoring strategy
and labor schedule are increasing in ability; at the threshold type, they drop discontinuously;
(6) every entrepreneur evades taxes; and (7) the eective tax rate is higher in the middle
of the type distribution; thus, the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from
evasion is unknown.
In Section 4, I present an example that summarizes the intuition behind these results,
which are analytically derived in Section 5. In Section 6, I discuss some generalizations to
the model.
In Section 7, I quantitatively explore the implications of this model. In particular, I estab-
lish a lower bound to the net revenue increase if the mechanism developed in this paper were
counterfactually adopted. Under the assumption that the U.S. is a \relatively distortion-
free" competitive economy,3 I use data on employment and entrepreneurship from the Survey
of Consumer Finance to impose some discipline on the managerial-ability distribution.
Results suggest that, once adopted, the optimal mechanism can substantially increase
revenue and reduce evasion in the U.S. Among nonfarm sole proprietors, for a conservative
choice of parameters, revenue collection increases by at least 59 percent, and the fraction
of reported income is at least 86 percent, as opposed to 43 percent documented in Slemrod
[2007]. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
I consider a two-stage game in which entrepreneurs remit taxes to the IRS. Taxes may
potentially be evaded. In the rst stage, the IRS commits to a monitoring strategy that
depends both on labor input and reported income. In the second stage, entrepreneurs take
into account the monitoring strategy and choose labor input and reported income.
3By relatively distortion-free, I mean an economy in which policies do not target the rm size. By
competitive, I mean an economy in which entrepreneurs take prices as given and maximize expected prots.
5There is a continuum of rms of measure one. Each rm is owned and managed by a
single entrepreneur, who experiences a random managerial ability z, which is her privately
observed type. I assume that z is independently and identically distributed according to G
twice continuously dierentiable, with density g = G0 uniformly bounded away from zero,
and compact support [z;z] with z  0.
There is a single good produced with a variable factor, labor n which is observable, and
a xed factor, managerial ability z. Hence, production displays decreasing returns to scale,
which are important to generate positive prots in a competitive environment. Moreover, as
Lucas [1978] points out, heterogeneity in managerial ability generates a rm-size distribution,
which allows the IRS to screen over n.
The production technology is zn, with  2 (0;1) common to all rms. This functional
form is chosen for tractability. I discuss the consequences of adopting a more general pro-
duction function in Section 6.1. In particular, I show that the production technology can





i=0 i 2 (0;1) and i  0 for i = 0;::;I, as long
as other inputs fkigI
i=1 are not observable.4 This generalization extends the scope of the
model's application. In some contexts, labor might not be readily observable. However, n
can be interpreted as any other observable factor of production.5
Let wages be the numeraire, and p be the price of the good; thus, pre-tax prots are
(n;z) = pzn   n. Notice that the ecient level of employment is n(z) = (pz)
1
1 .
A prot tax rate  is imposed exogenously by the government. After observing her own
type z, the entrepreneur decides how much labor to hire and income to report to the IRS.
Let reported prots be x  0, so x is the amount the entrepreneur pays out as taxes, and
((n;z) x) is the amount she evades. The IRS (the principal) costlessly observes labor n
and reported income x. However, it is able to observe ability z and, hence, actual income,
4Even if other inputs are observable, it is enough to assume that the IRS does not condition its monitoring
strategy on them.
5In some sectors, for instance, unskilled workers such as illegal immigrants are not readily observable.
However, the IRS might still observe another input, such as electricity bills, skilled labor or an intermediate
good bought from a formal rm.
6only if it audits the rm at a constant cost c > 0. If an entrepreneur is audited, she is
assessed by maxf((n;z) x);0g, where  > 1 is a linear penalty on the amount evaded.6
Penalties are assumed to be linear for tractability; otherwise, I would not be able to rewrite
the IRS problem in terms of informational rents, a trick that simplies the solution.
Note that the IRS does not reward overreporting. Hence, without loss of generality,
I restrict the set of reported income to be [0;(n;z)], and set maxf((n;z)   x);0g =
((n;z)   x).
In this paper, the IRS is an agency responsible only for auditing and collecting taxes.
Choosing tax rates and penalties is beyond its scope.7 In particular, taxes would be fully
enforced without cost if penalties were arbitrarily large { that is,  ! 1. However, many
authors argue that an abusive use of penalties is limited by other factors, such as a common
ethical norm8 or, more economically, the need to restrain the power of corruptible self-
interested enforcers.9
The IRS knows the distribution of managerial ability, G. In the rst stage, in order to
maximize expected net revenue, the IRS commits to a monitoring strategy, which is an audit
probability function, '(n;x), that depends on both employment and reported income.
As Andreoni et al. [1998] argue, assuming that the IRS objective is to maximize expected
net revenue, instead of a welfare criterion, seems a reasonable positive description of how
many tax agencies behave in practice. However, most tax agencies do not explicitly commit to
a monitoring strategy that depends on available information. Thus, I justify this assumption
on a normative ground. If net revenue collection is the main concern, as in periods of high
6Implicitly, I assume that all penalties are enforced even if ((n;z) x) > (n;z) x; that is, penalties
are higher than post-tax prots. If limited liability is a concern, I could assume that  2 (1; 1
 ], which is
enough to guarantee that penalties are payable only with post-tax prots.
7These variables are usually chosen by other government entities such as the Treasury or Congress.
For example, in August 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Oce (U.S. GAO) published a report
(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071062.pdf) suggesting that the Congress require the IRS to periodically
adjust penalties for in
ation.
8Rosen [2005], for example, argues that \existing penalty systems try to incorporate just retribution.
Contrary to the assumptions of the utilitarian framework, society cares not only about the end result (getting
rid of the cheaters) but also the processes by which the result is achieved."
9See Polinsky and Shavell [2000] for a survey.
7budget decits, the best the IRS can do is to commit to a monitoring strategy that depends
on all costlessly observable variables.10
In the second stage, given ', the entrepreneur's problem is to choose n  0 and x 2
[0;(n;z)] in order to maximize her expected prots:
(n;x;'(n;x);z)  (n;z)   x   '(n;x)((n;z)   x):
Notice that labor is not only a factor of production, but also a signal of the true income.
Hence, at a production cost, labor input can be strategically distorted to signal a lower
income to the IRS.
Before proceeding with the analysis, I solve for the full-information case, in which z
is observable. Let '(n;x;z) be the full-information monitoring strategy, which is also a
function of z. In the second stage, an entrepreneur z weakly prefers to declare her true
prots (n;z) rather than underreport x < (n;z) whenever '(n;x;z)  1
.11 Similarly,
the IRS weakly prefers that an entrepreneur z declares her true prots (n;z) rather than
underreport x < (n;z) whenever it chooses '(n;x;z)  1
 in the rst stage.12
Consequently, the best the IRS can do is to induce ecient production and truthful








 if x 6= (n(z);z)
0 otherwise
:
As long as the IRS commits to it, all taxes are enforced at no cost.13 Information on
employment at each rm is not necessary to achieve the optimum, which is implemented
10See Reinganum and Wilde [1986] and Erard and Feinstein [1994] for models in which the IRS does not
commit to a monitoring strategy.
11Indeed, by comparing expected prots, (1   )(n;z)  (n;z)   x   '(n;x;z)((n;z)   x) if and
only if '(n;x;z)  1
.
12Indeed, by comparing expected revenue, (n;z)  x + '(n;x;z)((n;z)   x) if and only if
'(n;x;z)  1
.
13Recall that n(z) is the ecient labor, and it maximizes (1 )(n;z). I use the superscript  to denote
the full-information solution in order to highlight that it induces ecient employment per rm.
8only through o-equilibrium threats.
If the IRS does not observe z, an adverse selection problem arises. In order to increase
her expected prots, an entrepreneur may distort her labor decision and report less income.
To solve this problem, I adopt a mechanism-design approach. Since the IRS observes (n;x),
which can be interpreted as the message sent by the agent, an entrepreneur z chooses:
(n(z);x(z)) 2 argmax
n0;x2[0;(n;z)]
(n;z)   x   '(n;x)((n;z)   x): (1)
As opposed to other mechanism-design applications, such as monopoly screening, the
principal does not control the agents' choice variables (n and x in this paper). Hence, (1) is
equivalent to two sets of incentive compatibility constraints:
(IC) (n(z);x(z);(z);z)  (n(~ z);x(~ z);(~ z);z);8(z; ~ z) 2 [z;z]  [z;z]
(IC-out) (n(z);x(z);(z);z)  (n;x;'(n;x);z);8(z;n;x) such that
z 2 [z;z];n  0;x 2 [0;(n;z)] and (n;x) 6= (n(~ z);x(~ z)) 8~ z 2 [z;z];
where (z) = '(n(z);x(z)) is the direct monitoring strategy.
A variant of the revelation principle is derived, which states that it is enough to restrict
attention to the class of direct mechanisms that not only induces truth-telling due to (IC),
but also deters agents to choose out-of-equilibrium menus, which is captured by (IC-out). In
other words, without lost of generality, an agent reports her type, say ~ z, and is then assigned
a menu fn(~ z), x(~ z), (~ z)g. The direct mechanism fn(z);x(z);(z)gz is designed such that
an entrepreneur reports her type truthfully (i.e., ~ z = z), and gets a payo higher than those
associated with all possible o-equilibrium deviations.14
The set of out-of-equilibrium incentive compatibility constraints (IC-out) merits some
digression. It is optimal for the IRS to relax (IC-out) as much as possible by punishing,
14Notice that reported income is an observed choice variable instead of an unobserved type or action. The
revelation principle implies truthful revelation of types, so income can be misreported in equilibrium.
9through suciently high monitoring probabilities '(n;x), o-scheduled deviations. However,
one particular deviation does not depend on the auditing intensity; namely, to declare true
prots, x = (n;z), and pay the right amount of taxes. If this is the case, post-tax prots
are (1   )(n;z), which are maximized at n = n(z); thus, any mechanism must assign at
least (1   )(n(z);z) to the entrepreneur.
In principle, a type z entrepreneur could also deviate to other out-of-equilibrium alloca-
tions. However, given that any mechanism must assign at least (1   )(n(z);z) to her,
this problem is circumvented by setting '(n;x) = 1= for all o-scheduled (n;x). Indeed,
if '(n;x) = 1=, entrepreneurs prefer to declare their true prots instead of x < (n;z).15
Consequently, (IC-out) can be replaced by
(IR) (n(z);x(z);(z);z)  (1   )(n
(z);z);8z 2 [z;z]:
I call this set of constraints individual rationality (IR) because it states that any mecha-
nism must assign at least a reservation value of (1   )(n(z);z) to an entrepreneur z. It
cannot be interpreted as a participation constraint, but rather as a constraint that preserves
out-of-equilibrium incentive compatibility.
Figure 1 illustrates the role (IR) plays in the model. Suppose that the curve depicted on
the left (n;x)-plan represents a truth-telling, direct mechanism, such that each point in this
curve is associated with a single type z and, thus, with an audit probability (z). If any
pair (n;x) outside this curve is audited with intensity 1=, (IR) ensures that entrepreneurs
stick to the curve. In other words, through o-equilibrium threats, the IRS can implement
any truth-telling, direct mechanism that respects (IR).
However, in practice, it is not sensible policy to intensively audit everyone who reports
much more than expected. The right (n;x)-plan of Figure 1 shows an alternative way to
implement a truth-telling, direct mechanism that respects (IR). Those that report a lower-
than-expected income are audited intensively. Those that report above some threshold curve,
15Recall that (1   )(n;z)  (n;z)   x   '(n;x)((n;z)   x) if and only if '(n;x)  1=.
10the dashed line, are not audited. In the shaded region between the dashed and the solid
lines, auditing intensities are set to deter o-scheduled deviations, but not necessarily equal
to 1=.
Figure 1: Implementation.
I am ready to state the IRS problem. Assume that n, x, and  are piecewise continuously





fx(z) + (z)[((n(z);z)   x(z))   c]gdG(z)
s.t.
(IC) (n(z);x(z);(z);z)  (n(~ z);x(~ z);(~ z);z);8(z; ~ z) 2 [z;z]  [z;z]
(IR) (n(z);x(z);(z);z)  (1   )(n
(z);z);8z 2 [z;z]
(F) (z) 2 [0;1];x(z) 2 [0;(n(z);z)];n(z)  0;8z 2 [z;z]:
That is, the IRS solves for the direct mechanism fn(z);x(z);(z)gz that maximizes expected
net revenue subject to (IC), (IR) and feasibility (F), which requires that the set of oered
menus corresponds to feasible probabilities, income declarations, and labor input.
Using terminology from Lewis and Sappington [1989]'s, this model displays countervailing
incentives. On the one hand, an entrepreneur has incentives to underreport z and pay less
in taxes. On the other hand, since the reservation value, (1   )(n(z);z), is increasing in
11z, an entrepreneur is also tempted to overstate z and be assigned a higher value. That is, in
order to satisfy (IR), the principal tends to design more favorable allocations towards higher
types; thus, an entrepreneur has incentives to overstate z and get a better allocation.16
S anchez and Sobel [1993] and Bigio and Zilberman [2011] study optimal enforcement
policies in a similar environment. The former paper assumes that income is exogenous;
thus, auditing probabilities cannot be conditioned on employment. The latter conditions
the monitoring strategy only on labor input. In these papers, the IRS is assigned a xed
budget, which is exhausted in order to maximize revenue.17 Moreover, S anchez and Sobel
[1993] consider a more general tax schedule, while Bigio and Zilberman [2011] consider more
general production and audit cost functions. For simplicity, I specify functional forms for
these primitives, although in Section 6, I discuss the extent to which they can be relaxed.
See these papers for further discussion of most of the assumptions used here.
The next proposition, adapted from S anchez and Sobel [1993], serves as a benchmark for
the rest of the analysis. It assumes that labor input is not observable. The proof follows
the steps in Bigio and Zilberman [2011] and is omitted. Let the superscript x denote the
optimal solution when the monitoring strategy is conditioned only on reported income.
16Countervailing incentives imply that the solution is not necessarily characterized by the full informational
rent extraction of the lowest type, so standard tricks in the literature are not readily applicable here.
17Operationally, both environments are similar since a budget constraint of the form
R
(z)cdG(z)  C,
where C is the assigned budget, can be cast in the principal's problem using a Lagrange multiplier, say
  0. Hence, a revenue maximizer IRS optimizes
R
fx(z) + (z)[((n(z);z)   x(z))   c]gdG(z) + C
subject to (F), (IR), and (IC).
12Proposition 1. (S anchez and Sobel [1993], adapted) If the monitoring strategy does not
depend on labor input, then there always exists a solution to the model of the following form:
n






1= if z  z < zx







(n(z);z) if z  z < zx
(n(zx);zx) if zx  z  z
;
where zx 2 [z;z].
In words, there is a threshold type zx, such that the IRS monitors every type below zx
in a way that generates a truthful income report. In contrast, every type greater than, or
equal to, zx is not audited and reports zx's prots. As a consequence, the most produc-
tive entrepreneurs are the set of evaders. Note that policy cannot distort labor input, so
production is carried out eciently.18
3 Implementability
Let U denote the informational rent, which is the expected prots minus the reservation
value, an agent gets. Hence,
U(z) = max
~ z2[z;z]
f(n(~ z);z)   x(~ z)   (~ z)((n(~ z);z)   x(~ z))   (1   )(n
(z);z)g: (2)
The following lemma is standard and states necessary and sucient conditions for the
incentive-compatibility constraint be globally satised. The proof is omitted.
18If the monitoring strategy depends only on labor input, as in Bigio and Zilberman [2011], the IRS audits
the most-productive entrepreneurs in a way that generates ecient production and truthful income report.
In contrast, lower types are not audited and report zero prots. Moreover, some of the lower types have their
labor input distorted away from its ecient level in order to prevent higher types from mimicking them,
which generates a missing middle { that is, medium rms are scarce.




(z) = (1   (z))pn(z)
   (1   )pn
(z)
 a.e.,
(M): (1   (z))n(z)
 is non-decreasing;
and that U is absolutely continuous.
These two conditions are crucial to understanding the results in this paper. The local
incentive compatibility (LIC) follows from applying the envelope theorem19 to (2) and evalu-
ating the resulting equation at ~ z = z. It species the required slope of the informational rent
to induce truth-telling. Notice that (LIC) provides a clear interpretation of countervailing
incentives. The rst term captures the incentives to understate z and, thus, pay less in taxes,
whereas the second term captures the temptation to overstate z and, thus, be assigned a
higher reservation value.
(M) is a variant of the monotonicity condition present in the mechanism-design literature.
If, for example, equilibrium audits are ruled out from the problem { that is, (z) = 0 for
all z { then (M) collapses to n(z) being non-decreasing. Intuitively, by setting high enough
o-equilibrium auditing intensities, the IRS can always shape reported income x to work as if
it were compensatory transfers, as in a textbook mechanism-design problem (e.g., Fudenberg
and Tirole [1991]). Hence, a non-decreasing labor schedule is sucient for implementability.
In contrast, if the monitoring strategy does not depend on n, then labor distortions
cannot be used to provide incentives. Therefore, (M) collapses to (z) being non-increasing.
This is a standard property in the optimal-tax-enforcement literature.20 It prevents higher
types from mimicking a low type in order to pay less in taxes.
By combining the use of both labor distortions and auditing intensities to provide in-
centives, standard monotone conditions can be relaxed, while incentive compatibility is still
19See Milgrom and Segal [2002].
20When taxpayers are risk-averse, Mookherjee and Png [1989] show that the monotonicity of the monitoring
strategy may not hold.
14satised. Indeed, for a given z, it is possible to increase (or decrease) both n(z) and (z)
such that (1 (z))n(z) remains constant. In words, costly audits and labor distortions
can be traded o without violating (LIC) and (M). How should audits and distortions be
optimally combined in order to enforce taxes? I tackle this question in the next sections.
4 Example
This section shows an example that summarizes the intuition behind the results in this paper.
I assume that z follows a uniform distribution with support [2;3],  = 1=2, p = 1,  = 1,
and  = 0:25. The next section provides an analytical solution.21
Figure 2 illustrates the solution for dierent values of c. Rows depict the behavior
of employment n, reported income x, auditing intensity , and the informational rent U,
respectively. The rst column considers c = 0. Since the IRS faces no cost to audit en-
trepreneurs, the full-information revenue is recovered. In particular, audits suce to fully
enforce taxes, and labor is not distorted away from its ecient level. That is, n(z) = n(z),
x(z) = (n(z);z), and (z) = 1= almost everywhere.
On the other hand, if c is high enough, as in the fourth column,22 it is too costly to use
auditing probabilities in equilibrium. Therefore, only labor distortions are used. As in a stan-
dard mechanism-design problem, the top type is not distorted away from the full-information
case; that is, n(z) = n(z), while labor is distorted downwards to provide incentives. Below
a threshold type, call it z1, depicted by the dashed line, the individual rationality binds,
which places a limit on the further use of distortions to provide incentives. In particular,
employment has to be adjusted to keep U(z) = 0 for z  z1. As opposed to problems without
countervailing incentives, the individual rationality can bind at intermediate types.
The most interesting case is when c takes intermediate values, as in the second and third
columns, for c = 0:35 and c = 0:45, respectively.
21In the next section, I state three additional assumptions on the primitives and one property that the
solution must have to be optimal. Those are satised in this example.
22In this particular example, for c  0:54.
15Figure 2: Optimal mechanism.
Similarly, the \non-distortion at the top" result also holds here, and labor is distorted
downwards up to a threshold type, call it z2, which is the (right) dashed line in the second
(third) column. In this region, only distortions are used.
Below z2, up to another threshold, call it z3, which is the left dashed line in the second
column,23 the IRS combines both distortions and audits to enforce taxes. For z 2 [z3;z2),
both (z) and n(z) are increasing. At z = z2, they drop discontinuously.24 In this region,
23In this example, for all c > 0:375, z3 > z. If c  0:375, z3 = z.
24These discontinuities might not be visible in Figure 2, but some of the plots are reproduced in Figure 3.
16the individual rationality binds.
Figure 3: Optimal mechanism, c = 0.45.
In Figure 3 for c = 0:45, I compare the optimal mechanism that conditions the monitoring
strategy on both reported income and labor input (thin lines), with the one that conditions
it only on the former (thick lines), as in Proposition 1.25 Once the IRS also screens over labor
input, it is optimal to exchange costly audits for distortions in order to provide incentives
and maximize net revenue.
To understand the intuition behind the jump at z2, notice that, in order to increase net
revenue, the use of audits are twofold: (1) it enforces taxes from those that are audited;
and (2) it prevents deviations from other types, allowing the IRS to require higher income
declarations from them. In the top range of the type distribution, entrepreneurs have strong
incentives to understate their type and then pay less in taxes. Hence, monitoring those at the
top is eective to enforce their taxes, but ineective to prevent deviations from other types.
Given that the audit cost is lumpy, the jump of the monitoring strategy at z2 balances these
two goals. It allows the IRS to audit and enforce taxes from intermediate productive types
and, at the same time, to establish a lower bound on the income reported by the highest
types.
If the monitoring strategy depended only on reported income, the same reasoning would
25Following the steps in S anchez and Sobel [1993], zx (from Proposition 1) is the unique root in [2;3] that








2 . For c > 1, such a root does
not exist; thus, zx = z = 2.
17justify that it discontinuously drops at zx. However, as depicted in Figure 3, the ablest
entrepreneurs do not report, or bunch at, the threshold type income anymore. Intuitively,
by distorting labor downwards to provide incentives, the IRS can separate the equilibrium
and design an increasing reported income schedule. The jump in the labor schedule is
necessary to keep U continuous and, thus, preserve incentive compatibility. At the same
time, it also assigns fewer distortions for those below z2, which increases production and net
revenue collection.
To understand the intuition behind an increasing monitoring strategy at [z3;z2), recall
from Lemma 1 that the possibility to screen over n relaxes the monotonicity requirement
that (z) is non-increasing. Hence, a non-monotone monitoring strategy is consistent with
incentive compatibility. Moreover, incentives to overstate z and be assigned a higher reser-
vation value are relatively stronger in the bottom range of the type distribution. Therefore,
an increasing monitoring strategy at [z3;z2) not only prevents type misreporting, but also
allows the IRS to save on expenses by selecting a more productive group of entrepreneurs to
audit. Finally, individual rationality, which is binding in this region, determines the amount
of distortion used in equilibrium.26
In the third column of Figure 2, for z  z3, feasibility imposes a limit on the use of
auditing probabilities. Thus, labor distortions are adjusted to respect individual rationality,
which is still binding in this region. In this case, the lowest types are not monitored in
equilibrium.
Interestingly, if c is not too high, the model predicts a missing middle in the reported
income space. In other words, some intermediate values of income are never reported to the
IRS. Moreover, there is a region in which two dierent types employ the same amount of
labor.
Finally, it is the possibility of setting o-equilibrium threats that makes audits a powerful
tool to enforce taxes. As Figure 1 and the second row of Figure 2 illustrate, for any value of
26In the next section, I show that U(z) = 0 if and only if (LIC) is equalized to zero; that is, (1  
(z))pn(z) = (1   )pn(z). Given (z), this equation determines n(z) wherever (IR) is binding.
18c, the reported income schedule is positive, which translates into a positive lower bound on
the net revenue collected.27 In Section 7, I explore this insight to assess the revenue gains
from adopting the optimal mechanism in practice.
In the next two subsections, I use this example to discuss further insights from the model.
4.1 Key driving forces
In this section, I argue that both countervailing incentives and observability of labor are the
key driving forces behind the non-monotonicity of the optimal auditing scheme.
If  = 1,28 the reservation value, (1 )(n(z);z), ceases to be type-dependent and, thus,
countervailing incentives are ruled out. I show below that, in this case, the optimal moni-
toring strategy is non-increasing. Every z below a threshold type is audited with intensity




(z) = (1   (z))pn(z)
 a.e.,
(M=1) : (1   (z))n(z)
 is non-decreasing;
respectively. Consequently, a non-monotone monitoring strategy could be implementable,
although it is not optimal.
Therefore, a type-dependent reservation value is necessary to break the monotonicity
result that (z) is non-increasing. But is it sucient? No. If labor input is not observable,
countervailing incentives are still present in the model, but Proposition 1 follows. Assume
27Similarly, if labor is not observable and c becomes arbitrarily large, taxpayers declare the lowest-type
income (see Proposition 1).
28 = 1 describes a context in which the principal aims to fully appropriate the agent's prots. This
action can be legitimate, as in the example of a holding company requiring reports on the protability of its
subsidiaries. But it can also be illegitimate, as in the example of a local maa extorting business owners.




(z) = (1   (z))pn
(z)
   (1   )pn
(z)
 a.e.,
(Mx) : (z) is non-increasing;
respectively. The IRS cannot implement a non-monotone monitoring strategy.
4.2 Implications
In a risk-neutral environment, if the IRS commits to a monitoring strategy that depends only
on reported income, the cut-o audit rule derived in Proposition 1 is a remarkably robust
result. However, its policy implications are unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the amount
underreported as a fraction of income increases with income, introducing a regressive bias
on eective taxes. Second, only those who declare income honestly { precisely the poorest
taxpayers { will be audited. In this section, I show how these implications change once the
monitoring strategy also depends on labor.
4.2.1 Underreported income
Let underreported income as a fraction of true income be 1 x(z)=(n(z);z). Figure 4 plots
this variable for dierent values of c. The solid line represents the optimal mechanism when
the monitoring strategy depends on both reported prots and labor input, while the dashed
line conditions the monitoring strategy only on the former.
In contrast with the previous literature, every taxpayer evades in the model. More-
over, the relationship between income and the fraction of income that is underreported is
non-monotone and discontinuous. In particular, those in the bottom and top underreport
proportionally more than those in the middle range of the type distribution.
20Figure 4: Underreported income as a fraction of true income.
4.2.2 Eective tax rate: regressive or progressive bias?
If the IRS screens only over reported income, eective taxes are regressive since the set
of evaders consists of the most productive entrepreneurs. Once the monitoring strategy is
conditioned on a signal of the true income, this regressive bias could be mitigated.29
Let the expected eective tax rate for a given type z be

e(z) 
x(z) + (z)((n(z);z)   x(z))
(n(z);z)
:
Figure 5 plots e(z) against true prots for dierent values of c. The solid line represents
the optimal mechanism when the monitoring strategy depends on both reported prots and
labor input, while the dashed line conditions the monitoring strategy only on the former.
Eective taxes are unevenly distributed. On the one hand, the poorest entrepreneurs are
paying proportionally less in taxes. On the other hand, eective taxes decrease in the top
29To my knowledge, Scotchmer [1987] was the rst to formally point out this possibility. In her model,
taxpayers are grouped into classes according to their income signal. As a result, eective taxes are progressive
across classes, although regressive within. In her paper, both income and its signal are exogenous. See, also,
Macho-Stadler and P erez-Castrillo [2002]. In Bigio and Zilberman [2011], for instance, eective taxes are
progressive since the lowest types are the set of evaders.
21range of the distribution. Therefore, the overall bias from evasion on the progressiveness of
taxes is unknown. Intuitively, by placing higher eective taxes in the middle range of the
type distribution, the IRS not only prevents those in the top range from understating z, but
also targets its audit expenses towards a more productive group of entrepreneurs.
Figure 5: Expected eective tax rate.
4.2.3 Outcomes of audits
Once the IRS commits to the cut-o audit rule described in Proposition 1, all audited
taxpayers are known to have reported honestly. This case is depicted in the rst plot of
Figure 6, where the thick line is the optimal monitoring strategy (z), and the thin line is
the amount evaded ((n(z);z)   x(z)). Ex-post, audits do not generate revenue for the
government. Hence, the IRS is tempted to deviate from its announced monitoring strategy
and audit the ablest entrepreneurs.
Once the audit rule also depends on n, as in the second plot, audits generate some gross
revenue, but not necessarily positive net revenue. Note that audits no longer target honest
taxpayers. Hence, although there still exist ex-post protable deviations, a stronger case for
the IRS's ability to commit can be made.
22Figure 6: Outcomes of audits, (z) vs. ((n(z);z)   x(z)), c=0.45.
Finally, the richest taxpayers are never audited in both mechanisms. However, in con-
trast with the cut-o audit rule, the poorest taxpayers might also not be audited once the
monitoring strategy is conditioned on n.
5 Solution











(z) = (1   (z))pn(z)
   (1   )pn
(z)
, a.e.
(IR) U(z)  0;8z 2 [z;z]




z (1   )(n(z);z)dG(z).
To solve this problem, I ignore (M), (z)  1, n(z)  0, x(z)  0, and x(z)  (n(z);z),
23for all z, from the set of constraints. Notice that x(z)  (n(z);z) is implied by (IR)30
and that (z)  1 never binds in equilibrium.31 The remaining ignored constraints must be
veried in equilibrium.
Let  be the costate variable associated with the state variable U. The Hamiltonian is
H(U;n;;;z) = [pzn
   n   U   c]g(z) + [(1   )pn
   (1   )pn
(z)
]:
For a given type z, let !(z) and (z) be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (z)  0
and U(z)  0, respectively. The Lagrangian is
L(U;n;;;z) = H(U;n;;;z) + U + !:
Let the superscript o denote the optimum solution to the optimization problem stated
above. Following Seierstad and Sydster [1987] (Theorem 2, page 361), given that H is
concave in , the following set of conditions is sucient for a global maximum.
1.
h





2. cg(z) + (z)pno(z) = !(z);
3. d
dz(z) = g(z)   (z);
4. dUo
dz (z) = (1   o(z))pno(z)   (1   )pn(z);
5. !(z)  0; o(z)  0; !(z)o(z) = 0;
6. (z)  0; Uo(z)  0; (z)Uo(z) = 0;
7. (z)Uo(z) = 0;(z)  0;(z)Uo(z) = 0;(z)  0;
8. (z )  (z+); [(z )   (z+)]Uo(z) = 0;
30Indeed, x(z)  (n(z);z) if and only if U(z)  (1   )[(n(z);z)   (n(z);z)].
31Recall from Section 2 that (z) = 1= suces to generate truthful income report and to provide incen-




One and two, above, are the rst order conditions with respect to n and , respectively.
Three is the costate law of motion. Four is the local incentive-compatibility constraint. Five
and six are the complementary slackness conditions that ensure feasibility and individual
rationality, respectively. Seven is the set of transversality conditions. Eight needs to be
satised if the costate  is allowed to be discontinuous.32 Finally, 9 guarantees that the
Hamiltonian is concave in n. Notice that 9 can be ignored since it is implied by 1 and
o(z)  1=.
The proof consists of a guess-and-verify method. The trick is to conjecture the subsets
of the type space [z;z], in which the inequalities Uo  0 and o  0 are binding. In other
words, it is to set the appropriate values for the Lagrange multipliers  and ! along the
interval [z;z].33
First, note that if the solution is continuously left dierentiable at the top-type z, then
no(z) = n(z), o(z) = 0, and Uo(z) > 0. Moreover, (z) = 0, !(z) > 0 and (z) = 0.34
This is a variant of the \non-distortion at the top" kind of result, in which the top type is
not distorted away from the full-information case and gets positive informational rent.
By continuity, Uo(z) > 0 and !(z) > 0, which implies (z) = 0 and o(z) = 0, for all
z < z in a small neighborhood of z. Moreover, by solving the dierential equation in 3 with











To proceed with the analysis, I assume one restriction on the distribution of types. Dene
32Throughout the paper, I use the following notation: h(z ) is the left limit of h at z, h(z+) is the right
limit of h at z, d
 h
dz (z) is the left derivative of h at z, and d
+h
dz (z) is the right derivative of h at z.
33This strategy is partially inspired by Maggi and Rodr guez-Clare [1995]'s analysis of a mechanism-design
problem that features a type-dependent participation constraint. However, since this setup is dierent, the
map from this paper to theirs is not perfect. In particular, here, the agent's objective is not quasi-linear
and there are two decision variables. Moreover, for a certain range of values for c, the optimal mechanism is
discontinuous. See Jullien [2000] for an alternative treatment of type-dependent participation constraints.
34Indeed, from 7, (z)  0. Hence, since c > 0, then !(z) > 0 (from 2) and (z) = 0 (from 5). Moreover,
no(z)  n(z) (from 1), which implies d
 U
o
dz (z) > 0 (from 4). If, by contradiction, Uo(z) = 0, then there
exists z < z such that Uo(z) < 0, which violates 6. Hence, Uo(z) > 0, which implies (z) = 0 (from 7),
(z) = 0 (from 6), and no(z) = n(z) (from 1).
25h  1 G
g , which is one over the hazard rate, and 
  [1   (1   )
1 
 ] 2 (0;1).
Assumption 1. 
z   h(z) is non-decreasing.
This assumption is a weaker version of the monotone hazard rate condition commonly
assumed in the literature. Indeed, if h(z) is non-increasing, then Assumption 1 holds. The
role of this assumption is twofold: First, it ensures that (M) is satised without the addi-
tional expositional cost of dealing with bunching; second, it guarantees that the individual
rationality constraints are not violated.
The task, now, is to nd a region in the type space, such that either o(z)  0 or (z)  0
ceases to hold with equality. Notice that for all z in a small neighborhood of z, both
dUo
dz
(z) = p(p[z   h(z)])

1    (1   )p(pz)











> 0 (from 2) (4)
hold by continuity. I conjecture that o(z)  0 or (z)  0 or both cease to hold with equality
wherever one of the inequalities in (3) or (4) is strictly reversed. The solution displays the
property that Uo(z) = 0 if and only if d Uo
dz (z) = 0.
Formally, dene A(z)  
z   h(z),35 which is non-decreasing by Assumption 1, and let
z1 = sup
s2[z;z]
fA(s)  0g: (5)
The term in curly brackets in equation (5) is obtained from reverting the inequality in (3).
By construction, if fs 2 [z;z] : A(s)  0g is not empty, Assumption 1 implies that z1 is the
highest root that solves A(s) = 0, and that dUo
dz (z) > 0 for all z > z1. If it is empty, let
z1 = z.
35Recall that 
  [1   (1   )
1 
 ] 2 (0;1).





fB(s) > cg: (6)
The term in curly brackets in equation (6) is obtained from strictly reverting the inequality
in (4). By construction, if fs 2 [z;z] : B(s) > cg is not empty, then B(z2) = c. If it is empty,
let z2 = z.
In words, analyzing from the right, if z1  z2, then the dierential equation in 4 would
be equalized to zero before conditions 2 and 5 are violated. On the other hand, if z2 > z1,
(z) = 0 for some z < z2 would violate conditions 2 and 5 before the dierential equation in
4 is equalized to zero. In particular, I show that for z  maxfz1;z2g, (z)  0 or o(z)  0
or both cease to hold with equality.
First, consider the case z1  z2 or, equivalently, c  maxs2[z1;z] B(s). The next proposi-
tion studies the case depicted in the fourth column in Figure 2, in which c is too high.










1  if z  z < z1
(p[z   h(z)])
1
1  if z1  z  z
;

























zg(z) if z  z < z1
G(z)   1 if z1  z  z
:
Moreover, the solution is continuous.
Proof. For z  z1, the proof is outlined in the text. Hence, if z1 = z, the result follows.
Assume that z1 > z. For z < z1, set o(z) = 0, and solve 1 and 4 (equalized to zero) in
27no(z) and (z). Hence, (z) =  





(z) is continuous, so 8 is satised.
Note that Assumption 1 implies that  [
g(z) + g0(z)h(z)]  g(z). From 3 and 6, (z) =
g(z) d
dz(z)  0 is equivalent to  
[g(z)+zg0(z)]  g(z), which is satised if g(z)+zg0(z)  0.
If g(z)+zg0(z)  0, which implies that g0(z) < 0, it is enough to show that  
[g(z)+zg0(z)] 
 [
g(z) + g0(z)h(z)] or, equivalently, 
z  h(z) for all z  z1, which follows from z1's
denition and Assumption 1. Hence, (z) < 0 and Uo(z) = 0 are consistent with condition
6, the dierential equation in 4 equalized to zero, and condition 7.
It remains to show that conditions 2 and 5 hold; that is, !(z) = cg(z)+(z)p(no(z)) 




c. Hence, it is enough to show that 
z1p(1   )(pz1)

1   c. Recalling the denition of
z1, this requirement collapses to B(z1)  c, which follows from z1  z2.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that dno
dz (z)  0,
do
dz (z) = 0, dxo
dz (z)  0, wherever
these derivatives exist, and no(z)  0 and xo(z)  0. Hence, the omitted constraints are
satised.
Consider z2 > z1 instead. Hence, !(z2) = 0 and d+Uo
dz (z2) > 0. One attempt to solve this
case is to keep (z) = G(z) 1 in a small neighborhood of z2, and for z < z2, let both no(z)
and o(z) jointly solve conditions 1 and 2 (with !(z) = 0) in this neighborhood. However,
the solution to this system implies that o(z) < 0 for some z < z2 in any neighborhood of
z2.36 Therefore, this approach does not work. To make further progress, (z) needs to be
changed for z < z2, and from conditions 3, 7 and 8, it follows that Uo(z2) = 0.
Consequently, a natural candidate for the optimal mechanism when z < z2 and z2 > z1
36Indeed, x z < z2 in a small neighborhood of z2 such that B(z) > c. By solving condition 2 (with
!(z) = 0) at n(z) and using c < B(z), one obtains no(z) < (p[z   h(z)])
1
1 . An inspection of condition 1
shows that this inequality is true if and only if o(z) < 0.
28is the solution to the following system of three equations in three unknowns (, n and ).
[g(z)z + (1   )]pn
 1   g(z) = 0
cg(z) + pn
 = 0 (7)
(1   )n
   (1   )(pz)

1  = 0:
These equations are condition 1, condition 2 (with ! = 0), and the dierential equation in
condition 4 equalized to zero. The following assumption guarantees that if a solution to (7)
exists, it is unique.






If the tax rate is 25 percent, any   0:22 satises this assumption. Similarly, if  = 2=3,
then it is satised for any   0:36. Therefore, Assumption 2 holds for empirically plausible
values of  and . However, if  > 0:4, this assumption is violated for any value of .
Note that the derivative of the reservation value with respect to z, (1   )pn(z), is
decreasing in . Therefore, this assumption ensures that countervailing incentives are strong
enough.
The following lemma states sucient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution
to the system in (7).
Lemma 2. For  2 [0;1=] and n  0:
If c >













1 , it has a unique solution.
The proof is in Appendix A. This system might not have a solution for some small values
of z. Dene z3 2 [0;1) as being the unique root that solves the following equation in s.







29If z3 < z, redene z3 = z. Therefore, for all z 2 [z3;z2), the system in (7) has a unique
solution. Let it be denoted by f^ n(z); ^ (z); ^ (z)gz2[z3;z2).
The following lemma states some of the properties of this solution.
Lemma 3. f^ n(z); ^ (z); ^ (z)gz2[z3;z2) has the following properties:
1. ^ n(z) 2 [(1   )n(z);n(z)]; ^ (z) 2 [0;1=]; ^ (z) < 0;








dz(z)  0 and
d^ 
dz(z)  0;
4. ^ n(z) and ^ (z) do not depend on the distribution of types;
5. (1    ^ (z))^ n(z) = (1   )(pz)

1 .
This lemma is proved in Appendix A. The rst and second properties state that the can-
didate for the optimal mechanism is feasible and continuous at z3 if z3 2 (z;z2), respectively.
The third and fourth properties say that the labor input and auditing probabilities that solve
(7) are increasing in z and do not depend on G, although z2 depends. Finally, the fth is
the last equation of the system in (7), which guarantees that (M) is satised.
At this degree of generality, it is not possible to characterize closed-form solutions to
f^ n(z); ^ (z); ^ (z)gz2[z3;z2) for all possible values of .37 Hence, to proceed with the analysis,
I state a property that this solution might or might not have.
Property 1. For all z 2 [z3;z2), d^ 
dz(z)  g(z).
If Property 1 holds, it is possible to characterize the optimal mechanism. This property
is needed to ensure that (z)  0 for all z 2 [z3;z2), which guarantees that the individual
rationality is satised (see conditions 3 and 6).
The following lemma gives a sucient condition to ensure that Property 1 holds. Dene
  1+
 (1   )
1 
   2, and note that   0 from Assumption 2.
37If  = 1=2, for example, the system of equations in (7) has a closed-form solution. However, the formulas
are too convoluted, since a solution to a third degree polynomial equation is required. Hence, I solve this
system numerically in Section 4.
30Lemma 4. If 
   + z
g0(z)
g(z) 
 for z 2 [z3;z2), then Property 1 holds.
The proof is in Appendix A. This sucient condition imposes a joint restriction on , ,
and G. Although not readily interpreted, it can be useful to check if Property 1 is satised.






Finally, one last assumption is needed to characterize the optimal mechanism.
Assumption 3. z3  z1.
Assumption 3 is sucient to characterize the optimal allocation for z  z3. In particular,
for z  z3, the optimal allocation has the same closed form as the solution in Proposition 2
for z  z1. This assumption is far from being restrictive. A sucient condition, for example,
is that B(z) single crosses c.39
The cases depicted in the second and third columns of Figure 2 illustrate the following
proposition.
38If  = 1=2, as in Section 4, then any   1=4 ensures that Property 1 is satised.
39A weaker sucient condition is if B(z1) < c, then z1  z2. Indeed, assume, by contradiction, that
z3 > z1. Hence, using the denitions of z1 and z3, one obtains B(z1) < c, which implies that z1  z2.
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1  if z  z < z3
^ n(z) if z3  z < z2
(p[z   h(z)])
1





> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if z  z < z3
^ (z) if z3  z < z2






















> > > > <
> > > > :
 
zg(z) if z  z < z3
^ (z) if z3  z < z2
G(z)   1 if z2  z  z
:
The solution is discontinuous at z = z2. In particular, no(z
 
2 ) > no(z
+





2 ) = 0.
The proof is in Appendix A. The next corollary assumes that c ! 0, which is depicted
in the rst column of Figure 2.







Proof. At c = 0, ^ (z) = 1=, ^ n(z) = (pz)
1
1 , ^ (z) = 0, for all z, z2 = z, and z3 = z.
Finally, I also consider  = 1, which describes a context in which the principal aims to
fully appropriate the agent's prots. If  = 1, Assumption 2 is violated; thus, Lemmas 2, 3,
and 4, and Proposition 3 are not valid. In contrast, Proposition 1, which assumes z1  z2,
32is still valid. If z2 > z1, I rely only on Assumption 1 and Property 1 to prove the following
proposition.






n(z) if z  z < z2
(p[z   h(z)])
1







1= if z  z < z2












1 ds if z2  z  z
:
The solution is discontinuous at z = z2. In particular, no(z
 
2 ) > no(z
+





2 ) = 0.
Proof. For z  z2, the proof is outlined in the text. If z2 = z, the result follows. Assume
that z2 > z. For z < z2, the unique solution of the system of equations in (7) is ^ (z) = 1=,
^ n(z) = (pz)
1
1  = n(z), and ^ (z) =  cg(z)=pn(z). Since no(z
 







2 ) and 8 is satised. The remaining conditions follow from Property 1, which implies
(z)  0 and Uo(z) = 0.40
This is the case discussed in Section 4.1.
6 Extensions
To solve the problem, I specify functional forms for ve objects: (1) the production tech-
nology, F(z;n;K) = zn, where K is a vector of other inputs; (2) the utility function,










g(z), for all z  z2. In the example, in Section 4, this inequality veries if and
only if c  8.
33u(y) = y, where y is income or, equivalently, consumption in a static environment; (3) the
penalty function, M(e) = e, where e is the amount evaded; (4) the tax schedule, T(x) = x;
and (5) the audit cost function, C(z;n) = c. In this section, I argue whether or not these
assumptions can be modied without substantially changing the results.
6.1 Production technology
In this section, I discuss two possible generalizations for the production technology. First, I
consider a general function of the form zf(n). Second, I show how to extend the model to
accommodate multiple inputs, given that only one is costlessly observable.
6.1.1 General functional form
Recall that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, which are crucial to prove the results in this paper,
depend on the technological parameter . Consequently, in order to validate Propositions 2
and 3 under a more general production technology, it is necessary to adapt these assumptions.
Assume, for instance, that the production technology takes the form zf(n), where f0 > 0,
f00 < 0, and f(0) = 0. By applying the solution method developed in Section 5, one can
derive the same qualitative results but at an expositional cost, as ad-hoc, and somewhat
convoluted, restrictions on f and its derivatives would be imposed. It is challenging to
characterize the optimal mechanism when these restrictions are violated.41 Instead, I opt to
explore the Cobb-Douglas production function.
However, even for the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimal mechanism is not fully charac-
terized. Indeed, although realistic, Assumption 2 restricts the set of values  can take for
a given . It is important to understand how the optimal mechanism would behave if this
assumption were relaxed. Proposition 4 is a small step in this direction. I leave the charac-
terization of the mechanism when Assumption 2 is violated as an open question for further
41For the specic case of Proposition 2, in which c is high enough such that (z) = 0 for all z, the problem
is isomorphic to a standard mechanism-design problem with a type-dependent reservation value. Jullien
[2000] provides a comprehensive characterization of the optimal mechanism for this case.
34research.
6.1.2 Multiple inputs
In this section, I show how the production technology can be generalized to multiple inputs,





i=1 are the inputs that are not observable by the IRS.42 Assume that F displays
decreasing returns to scale, so
PI
i=0 i < 1, and i  0 for i = 0;::;I. Finally, let ri be the
price of input ki, which is bought in a competitive market.
In Appendix A, given that fkigI
i=1 are chosen in the second stage of the game, I show
that pre-tax prots can be written as
(n;z) = (z;p;frig;fig)n
   n; (8)






2 (0;1), and  is a function of figI
i=1, frigI
i=1, p, and z.
Consequently, the distribution of z, G, induces a distribution of , say ^ G, and the mechanism
developed above can be applied directly to . However, Assumptions 1 and 3 and Property
1 need to be restated in terms of  and ^ G. Finally, although pre-tax prots are n  n, the
output produced is not n.
In Section 7, where I pursue an empirical evaluation of the mechanism developed in this
paper, this extension will be useful for two reasons. First, it accounts for a more realistic
production technology. Second, if z is either log-normally or Pareto distributed, which is
commonly assumed in the literature, then  also is.
6.2 Audit cost
Without compelling empirical evidence, it is hard to inspect the shape of the audit cost
C(z;n).
42Similarly, even if some of these inputs are observable, it is enough to assume that the IRS does not
condition its monitoring strategy on them.
35One might argue, for instance, that large rms take longer to monitor than smaller
rms, which justies @C
@n  0. In contrast, there may be a visibility eect that reduces the
informational cost associated with monitoring larger rms, so it is also possible that @C
@n  0.
Similarly, a high-ability entrepreneur could nd it easier to circumvent the law and hide
her income, which justies @C
@z  0. However, if high ability translates into more-complex
business operations, the need to use accounting books could make @C
@z  0. Along these
lines, as Kleven et al. [2009] argue, if these books are known to many employees, because
of whistleblowing rewards, the entrepreneur is less likely to hide them successfully from the
IRS, so @C
@n@z  0.
Consequently, I adopt an agnostic view about the audit cost. In particular, I look for
restrictions on its partial derivatives that are sucient to support the qualitative results
from the previous section.
For simplicity, I assume that the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to n is





















It is easy to verify that Proposition 2, which assumes that z1  z2,44 would still be valid
whenever the LHS of 20 is greater than, or equal to, zero for all z  z1.45
If z2  z1, for z 2 [z3;z2], the optimal mechanism solves the system of equations in
(7). To account for a general audit cost, the rst and second equations in (7) need to be
substituted for 10 and 20 (with !(z) = 0). A close inspection of Appendix A, especially the
proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, reveals that the extra term @C
@n(z;no(z))(z) in 10 complicates
43A sucient condition is @
2C
@n2  0.
44Note that the denition of z1 does not change, but z2 needs to be redened. In particular, z2 =
sups2[z;z]fB(s) < C(s;(p[s   h(s)])
1
1 )g.
45A sucient condition is z @C
@n(z;no(z))dn
o
dz (z) + z @C







36the characterization of the mechanism. Thus, I set @C
@n = 0 and study the case in which the
audit cost C depends only on z.46
Under the additional assumption that zC0(z)  1
1 C(z), one can follow the steps in
Section 5 and verify that the characterization of the mechanism is qualitatively the same.
Note that this assumption can accommodate a non-monotone audit cost.
If zC0(z) > 1
1 C(z) at some range, the characterization of the mechanism would be
more complicated. Intuitively, if the cost to audit increases at a high rate, the IRS might
prefer to save audit expenses by following a non-monotone monitoring strategy in [z3;z2).
6.3 Tax schedule
By imposing a tax schedule of the form T(x) = x, I rule out possible interactions between
non-linearities on the tax system and the optimal monitoring strategy.47
Consider a general tax schedule T, twice continuous dierentiable. For simplicity, I
assume that the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to n is preserved. From the set
of sucient conditions for an optimum, the rst-order condition with respect to n becomes
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where Ti(z) = T((ni(z);z)), T 0
i(z) = T 0((ni(z);z)), and T 00
i (z) = T 00((ni(z);z)), for
i = o;. Unfortunately, no enters this expression in a convoluted way, jeopardizing any
attempt to extend the analytical results in Proposition 3 to a general tax schedule.
If c is high enough, such that o(z) = 0 for all z, an analogous proposition to Proposition
2, in which T 0
(z) plays the role of , can be derived.48 The crucial step is to show that
d
dz(z)  g(z), which is true under the assumptions that T 0 2 [0;1), T 00 > 0, and h(z) is






47If T(x) = 0+x, the characterization of the optimal mechanism does not change. However, net revenue
collection is increasing in 0.
48In this case, z1 can be dened in a similar way, and for z  z1, (z) =  
(z)zg(z), where 
(z) =





6.4 Penalty and utility functions
Linear penalties and risk neutrality are the hardest assumptions to relax. Consider penalties,
for instance. Under the assumption that the penalty function M is dierentiable, the local
incentive-compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
dU
dz
(z) = (1   (z)M
0(e(z)))pn(z)
   (1   )pn
(z)
; a.e.;
where e(z) = ((n(z);z)   x(z)). If M0(e) depended on e, the IRS problem could not be
rewritten in terms of informational rent U since x would still pop out in the Hamiltonian.
However, this trick substantially facilitates the use of optimal control techniques in order to
solve the problem. A similar argument can be developed for risk neutrality.49
7 A quantitative exploration
The message of this paper is that the IRS can increase net revenue if it is willing to impose
distortions almost everywhere. Hence, in order to inform policy, it is desirable to quantify
this trade-o.
Ideally, one would like to embed the IRS's actual practiced monitoring strategy into a
general model and use data on reported prots, actual prots, inputs, and audits to pin
down the distribution of managerial ability and the parameters of the model, such as the
audit cost c. Thus, it would be possible to counterfactually assess the implications of the
mechanism developed in this paper.
49In a standard mechanism-design problem, the principal's objective is usually written in terms of infor-
mational rents, instead of compensatory transfers. Consequently, transfers can not pop out in the set of
local incentive-compatibility constraints. This is obtained under the commonly used assumption that utility
is quasi-linear in transfers. In this paper, both linear penalties and risk neutrality allow reported income to
play a role similar to that of transfers.
38However, this approach poses two challenges. First, in most countries, including the
U.S., the audit scheme is strictly guarded or too obscure.50 Hence, it cannot be used as
a benchmark. Second, even in countries in which the tax-collection agency commits to a
publicly known monitoring strategy, such as in Italy,51 the lack of public data limits this
approach.
Therefore, in order to provide some assessment of the trade-o between revenue collection
and eciency, I follow an alternative approach. In particular, I focus on the potential revenue
gains from adopting the optimal mechanism. Let Ro be the revenue collection generated by
the optimal mechanism, and Ra be the actual revenue collected by the IRS from some set of
self-employed entrepreneurs. I establish a lower bound to Ro=Ra.
7.1 Back-of-the-envelope calculation
Let Y i and Xi, i = a;o;, be aggregate pre-tax prots and reported income, respectively.
Recall that a stands for the actual gures, o for the optimal mechanism outcome, and 
for the full-information outcome, in which production is carried out eciently. Notice that
Y   maxfY a;Y og. Moreover, let repi  Xi=Y i be the fraction of aggregate income that
is reported to the IRS. Finally, let  be the maximum probability that a rm is actually





o(z)[((no(z);z)   xo(z))   c]dG(z)
Xa +
R




Xa + (Y a   Xa)
=
repo  Y o
Y a
repa + (1   repa)

repo  Y o
Y 
repa + (1   repa)
: (9)
50Andreoni et al. [1998] describe how audit policy is conducted in the U.S. for individual income tax
returns. In a rst stage, intensive audits are conducted on a stratied random sample. Then, these results
are used to assess the likelihood that a report contains evasion. Slightly over one-half of all audit selections
are based at least partly on this method. However, the rules used to assign each report a likelihood that it
contains irregularities are strictly guarded.
51In Italy, for a given class of rms under the Studi di settore, presumed sales proceeds are statistically
inferred from easily observable variables, such as the surface area of oces and warehouses, the number of
employees, the type of customers, and so on. In particular, a small- or medium-sized rm can be audited if
it reports sales proceeds that are lower than a presumed level. See Arachi and Santoro [2007] and Santoro
[2008] for more details.
39The rst inequality imposes that c is high enough, such that o(z) = 0 for all z, which
underestimates the net revenue gain from adopting the optimal mechanism. Consequently,
the RHS of (9) is a lower bound to Ro=Ra. Since information on , , and repa can be
gathered, it remains to calculate repo and Y o=Y , which I do next.
7.2 Calculating Y , Y o, and repo


















2 (0;1), and  is a function of the prices, the technological
parameters, and the managerial ability.52 If z follows a truncated Pareto distribution, which
is assumed from now on,  also does. Let  be the shape parameter of 's underlying
distribution, ^ G, which has support [;]. The idea is to apply the optimal mechanism
directly to ^ G.
To calculate Y , Y o, and repo, I follow an approach similar to that of Guner et al.
[2008]'s analysis of policies that depend on rm size. In particular, I assume that the U.S. is
a \relatively distortion-free" competitive economy and use employment data to impose some
discipline on the distribution of managerial ability. By relatively distortion-free, I mean an
economy in which policies do not target the rm size. By competitive, I mean an economy





Note that distortions that do not target rm size, such as an input linear tax, are innocuous.
52Recall that production zn0 QI
i=1 k
i
i is not equal to (z;p;frigI
i=1;figI
i=1)n. Therefore, without
specifying values to prices, it is not possible to identify the eciency loss induced by the optimal mechanism.
40Indeed, in addition to prices, technological parameters, and managerial ability,  would also
absorb these distortions.
Note that I am implicitly assuming that either the actual monitoring strategy does not
depend on labor input (or any other proxy for rm size), or entrepreneurs do not internalize
it whenever they make employment decisions. Although it is likely that the IRS uses infor-
mation on business size to select audits, many authors have argued that taxpayers have little
knowledge of the audit function. In particular, they tend to overestimate the probability of
an IRS audit. See, for example, Andreoni et al. [1998].
By combining data on employment at each rm with equation (10), I set the parameters
, , and  to match some properties of the data. Hence, the assumption that the U.S. is a
relatively distortion-free competitive economy is needed only to impose some discipline on
the parameters underlying the distribution ^ G, which are subject to sensitivity analysis in
Appendix B.
Dene   1  
PI
i=0 i, which is the share of output that goes to the entrepreneur as
pre-tax prots, so that  = 0=(0 + ). By calibrating , 0, , , and , I can calculate
the full-information aggregate prots, Y  
R
[n()   n()]d ^ G().
To calculate Y o and repo and, thus, generate the counterfactual, I make two additional
assumptions. First, I rule out general equilibrium eects through prices; that is, I assume that
p and frigI
i=1 are xed. Second, I assume that the distribution of occupations is xed, such
that entrepreneurs are not allowed to become workers and vice-versa. These assumptions
make the distribution of , ^ G, invariant to policy. Thus, the optimal mechanism can be
applied directly to ^ G, which was backed out from employment data in a previous step.
If the demand for inputs in the corporate sector is relatively large, once compared with the
set of rms considered in this exercise, general equilibrium eects through prices is a minor
issue. Moreover, given that prices are xed and, due to withholding or third-party report,
wage taxes are fully enforced without cost, the possibility of moving across occupations
would further increase net revenue. Indeed, once adopted, the optimal mechanism reduces
41prots in the entrepreneurial sector. Therefore, a standard occupational-choice model would
predict more workers fully complying with taxes and fewer entrepreneurs managing rms,
which reinforces the aim of this exercise in providing a lower bound to Ro=Ra.53
Finally, in order to establish the RHS of (9), I assume that c is high enough, such that
only labor distortions are used in equilibrium, which underestimates the net revenue gain
from adopting the optimal mechanism. Consequently, to calculate Y o and Xo, I use the
optimal allocation derived in Proposition 2. Notice that I do not need to specify values for
the audit cost c and the linear penalty  to calculate these gures.
7.3 Calibration
Following Guner et al. [2008], I set  = 0:2, and 0 = (1   )  0:6.
To calibrate , , and , I use data on employment and entrepreneurship from the
2001 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). In particular, I restrict the sample to families in
which one member actively manages and owns only one business, as in the theory presented
above, and employs at least one worker. I consider only nonfarm sole proprietors, a group
that underreported 57 percent of its income in 2001, as documented in Slemrod [2007]. This
procedure leads to 825 observations. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the number
of workers at each rm.
Mean St. dev. Min Max Obs
# workers 6:92 26:68 1 299 825
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (weighted). Source: SCF 2001.
# workers [1,5) [5,10) [10,20) [20,100) [100,299]
Data 80:0% 13:1% 2:9% 2:5% 1:4%
Model 77:1% 10:9% 5:9% 5:2% 1:0%
Table 2: Firm size distribution in the data (weighted) and in the model that assumes a rela-
tively distortion-free competitive economy. Source: SCF 2001 and author's own calculations.
53This argument assumes that both self-employers and employees face the same income tax rate .
42I set  = 1:42 and  = 7:58, which implies that n() = 1 and n() = 299, as in the
sample. Similarly,  = 3:07 generates the average employment per rm in the data. Table 2
shows that this simple strategy matches the observed rm size distribution reasonably well.
Ecient aggregate prots, Y , are 14:4, which is reasonable once wages are the numeraire.
Under the assumptions stated above, to calculate Y o and repo, I need to specify a value for
 and then use the formulas from Proposition 2.54
Piketty and Saez [2007] document that the average federal individual income tax rate
was 11:5 percent in 2004. If payroll taxes are added, the tax rate increases to 20:8 percent.
Since this gure ignores both local and state taxes, I generate results for  ranging from 0:15
to 0:35.
I turn to the choice of  and  . According to the U.S. code, title 26,6663, \if any part
of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be
added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which
is attributable to fraud." However, typically, penalties are assessed at a rate of 20 percent
of the amount underpaid (Andreoni et al. [1998]).
Similarly, the IRS does not seem to rely on an intensive use of audits to enforce taxes.
According to the 2001 IRS Data Book, fewer than two percent of the schedule C returns were
audited.55 Hence, setting   = 0:15 seems a conservative choice, although I also generate
results for   ranging from 0:05 to 0:25.56
It is worth mention that if non-pecuniary penalties, such as the possibility of impris-
onment, were properly accounted for in the model, Ro=Ra would increase even more. The
same argument is valid for other types of cost, such as the nancial cost of hiring professional
assistance or the moral cost of being an outlaw.
54Given the values chosen for the parameters, the truncated Pareto distribution does not satisfy Assump-
tion 1. However, for the purpose of this empirical exercise, an inspection of the proof of Proposition 2 reveals
that this assumption can be relaxed as follows: 1. z  h(z) is non-decreasing for z  z1; 2. 
z  h(z)  0 for
z  z1; and 3.  
[g(z) + zg0(z)]  g(z) for z  z1. These properties are satised in this section.
55Schedule C returns are those led by nonfarm self-employed taxpayers.
56Even if some taxpayers face high probabilities of being audited, by plugging a smaller value for  , it is
still likely that the inequality in (9) is satised, especially if these taxpayers represent a small fraction of the
population.
43Finally, following Slemrod [2007], I set repa = 0:43, which is the fraction of nonfarm
sole-proprietor income reported to the IRS in 2001. This gure is provided by the IRS,
which combines information from a program of random intensive audits, ongoing enforcement
activities, and other special studies about particular sources of income (such as cash earnings)
that is unlikely to be uncovered even in an intensive audit. Alternatively, I also generate
results for repa = 0:65, which Feldman and Slemrod [2007] estimate by using unaudited tax
returns data for 1999 in the U.S. Under the assumption that charity donations are unrelated
to the source of income, these authors adapt the econometric approach in Pissarides and
Weber [1989] to estimate self-employment income underreporting.57
7.4 Results
Table 3 displays the results for repa = 0:43. It reports the lower bound to Ro=Ra, which is
the RHS of (9).
lower bound to Ro=Ra
 repo Y o
Y    = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15   = 0:20   = 0:25
0.15 0.91 0.98 1.95 1.83 1.73 1.64 1.56
0.20 0.88 0.97 1.87 1.76 1.66 1.57 1.50
0.25 0.86 0.96 1.79 1.68 1.59 1.51 1.43
0.30 0.83 0.94 1.71 1.61 1.52 1.44 1.37
0.35 0.81 0.92 1.62 1.53 1.45 1.37 1.30
Table 3: Results for repa = 0:43.
A conservative choice of the parameters indicates substantial gains, in terms of net rev-
enue, from adopting the optimal mechanism. If  = 0:25 and   = 0:15, for instance, net
revenue collection from this set of entrepreneurs would increase at least by 59 percent. For
nonfarm proprietor business income, repa = 0:43 is associated with a tax gap of $68 billion,
as reported in Slemrod [2007].58 Consequently, the extra revenue collected could potentially
57In their original approach, Pissarides and Weber [1989] assume that food consumption, instead of charity
donations, is unrelated to the source of income. These authors estimate that income underreporting for
British self-employed individuals was approximately 35 percent in 1982.
58A tax gap of $68 billion accounts for only individual federal income taxes, ignoring payroll, local, and
state taxes.
44be $30 billion, which was 0:3 percent of the GDP in 2001 or, equivalently, three percent of
the total federal individual income taxes collected in 2001.59 Interestingly, even in the worst
scenario { that is,  = 0:35 and repo = 0:81 { the degree of evasion is substantially lower
than the one observed in the data.
Table 4 displays the results for repa = 0:65. As expected, the gains from adopting the
mechanism are smaller, but still potentially large. For example, if  = 0:2 and   = 0:10,
net revenue collection from this set of entrepreneurs would increase by 25 percent.
lower bound to Ro=Ra
 repo Y o
Y    = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15   = 0:20   = 0:25
0.15 0.91 0.98 1.34 1.30 1.27 1.24 1.21
0.20 0.88 0.97 1.28 1.25 1.22 1.19 1.16
0.25 0.86 0.96 1.23 1.20 1.17 1.14 1.11
0.30 0.83 0.94 1.17 1.14 1.11 1.09 1.06
0.35 0.81 0.92 1.12 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.01
Table 4: Results for repa = 0:65.
In Appendix B, I do some sensitivity analysis by varying both  and . Results are
remarkably robust to variations of , but net revenue collected would increase even more for
higher values of .
Leaving aside explanations based on moral, psychological, or social factors, the discrep-
ancy between the model and the data highlights the inability of the IRS to deter evasion
through audits. Given that in the U.S., the strategy to select audits is strictly guarded,
these results suggest that the IRS can substantially ght evasion and, thus, increase revenue
collection by committing to an optimal monitoring strategy that depends on proxies for busi-
ness size. Recall that this exercise assumes that c is high enough, such that in equilibrium,
o(z) = 0 for all z; thus, these results do not rely on an intensive use of audits, which is
consistent with actual practices.
59A tax gap of $68 billion is an aggregation across heterogeneous classes of entrepreneurs, including those
that usually do not hire workers, such as independent contractors. Consequently, the potential $30 billion
of extra revenue should be viewed as an imperfect aggregator across classes, given that optimal monitoring
strategies were designed for each class based on a single observable input.
45The adoption of such mechanism raises other issues, such as the distortions it imposes or
its implications for horizontal equity. From an ethical point of view, an IRS behavior that
not only tolerates, but also explicitly, induces evasion would be questionable.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this exercise is somewhat limited, as a non-
linear tax schedule has implications for the optimal mechanism, the empirical strategy, and
the calibration procedure. It is not clear what kind of bias would arise if non-linearities in
the tax schedule were accounted for. I leave it as an open question for further research.
8 Final comments
The relevance of the theory presented in this paper hinges on the plausibility of two hy-
potheses. First, employment at each rm is easily observable by the IRS. Second, audits are
relevant to explain self-employment income tax evasion.
At least in developed countries, to a rst approximation, there is empirical evidence
suggesting that labor is readily available information to the IRS. Only a tiny percent of
wages and salaries are not reported to the IRS in the U.S. (Slemrod [2007]) and in Denmark
(Kleven et al. [2011]).60 If income taxes are subject to third-party report, as in the case of
employers withholding taxes on wages and salaries, it is unlikely that the parties involved
would collude to evade taxes.61 Moreover, as long as wages are partially declared, the IRS
still has information about the employee and the rm for which she works. Even if unskilled
workers, such as illegal immigrants, can be hidden, the extension in Section 6.1 shows that
the optimal mechanism can be applied as long as a single input is easily observable. Examples
of such input are skilled labor or an intermediate good bought from a formal rm.
What if reasons other than audits are the main determinants of self-employed income
tax evasion? Entrepreneurs, for example, might be caught in a web of business-to-business
60In contrast, di Porto [2011] documents that in Italy, artisan rms hide their workers in order to pay less
in social security taxes.
61In the U.S., for instance, rms issue W-2 forms, one for each worker, detailing her identity and the
amount of wages paid. Each form is sent to the IRS and the relevant employee. The latter uses the W-2
form to le her income tax return. See Logue and Slemrod [2010] for more details.
46transactions that facilitate enforcement for tax reasons.62 Similarly, access to the nancial
sector generates information that the IRS can use to enforce taxes (Gordon and Li [2009]).
Finally, when the use of accounting books, necessary to run complex business operations,
are known to many employees, the entrepreneur is less likely to hide them successfully from
the IRS (Kleven et al. [2009]).
Nonetheless, recent evidence from eld experiments, in which auditing probabilities are
exogenously controlled, shows that audits have a strong impact on self-reported income. See
Slemrod et al. [2001] for an experiment in the U.S., and Kleven et al. [2011] for another in
Denmark. Consequently, the design of monitoring strategies can play an important role in
increasing revenue collection, as the exercise in Section 7 highlights.
62For example, whenever a downstream rm buys from an upstream rm, value-added taxes along the
production chain generate tax credits to be used against future tax liabilities. Thus, this transaction is
observable by the IRS, and compliant rms have an incentive to deal among themselves (Kopczuk and
Slemrod [2006] and de Paula and Scheinkman [2010]).
47Appendix
A Proofs
The following proofs involve a change of variables that reduces the number of equations in
(7). Dene   1  and N  n. Using the rst and the second equations to eliminate

























N , and dene N  (pz)

1 . Since
2 is strictly decreasing, then any solution to this system implies that N 2 [(1   )N;N].
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Notice that 1 is strictly concave, and 2 is strictly convex. Therefore, 1 = 2 at most
at two values of N. Moreover, 1(N) = 0 < (1   ) = 2(N); thus, this system has one
solution if 1((1 )N) > 2((1 )N) = 1. A little algebra shows that this requirement
holds if and only if c <






This system does not have a solution if and only if 1(N) < 2(N) for all N 2 [(1  














48But Assumption 2 implies that ^ N  (1   )N. Hence, there are two possible candidates
for a maximum: (1 )N and N. Plugging them into the LHS and choosing the one that
yields the highest value, one concludes that this system does not have a solution if and only
if






Finally, when c =





1 , N = (1   )N and  = 1 is the only
solution to the system of equations above.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Items 1, 4 and 5 are immediate. Item 2 follows from the fact that c =






1 ; thus, N(z3) = (1   )N(z3) and (z3) = 1. It remains to show 3 { that is,
dN
dz  0 and d
dz  0.




























dz  0, it is enough to show that both the denominator and the numerator are negative.





























1 , it is enough to show that






which follows from Assumption 2.












Hence, it is enough to plug the smallest possible value for N, (1 )N, into this inequality
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Therefore, given   (1   ), for d
dz  0, it is enough to show that the denominator of the





























1 , it is enough to show that






which follows from Assumption 2.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Notice that (z) =  
cg(z)

















N(z) g(z) g0(z)  0, then the assertion is trivial. On the other hand, if
N0(z)

































1  for all z 2 [z3;z2),


































Consequently, by plugging (13) into (12), it is straightforward to verify that










  1   (1   )
1 
 .
51A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
For z  z2, the proof is outlined in the text. Hence, if z2 = z, the result follows. Assume
that z2 > z. For z 2 [z3;z2), set o(z) = ^ (z), no(z) = ^ n(z), and o(z) = ^ (z), which satisfy
conditions 1, 2, and 5. Moreover, Property 1 and condition 3 imply (z)  0; thus, from 6,
I set U(z) = 0, which agrees with the dierential equation in 4 equalized to zero, given that
U(z3) = 0 is the boundary condition. If z3 = z, since ^ (z3) < 0, condition 7 is satised.
It remains to show that 8 is satised. Note that at z = z2, both conditions 1 and 2 (with
! = 0) hold with equality, but 0 = d Uo
dz (z2) < d+Uo
dz (z2). Hence, at z = z2, no(z) and o(z)
are discontinuous.
If the domain of N and  are extended to [0;N] and [1 ;1), respectively, by following
similar steps to the ones in the proof of Lemma 2, one can verify that this system always






1 . Index these solutions by l and
h. At z = z2 , it is easy to verify that, without lost of generality, ^ nl(z2) < no(z
+
2 ) < ^ nh(z2),
^ l(z2) < o(z
+
2 ) < ^ h(z2), and ^ l(z2) < (z
+
2 ) < ^ h(z2). By restricting the domain of N and
 to be between [(1   )N;N], and [(1   );1], respectively, the solution indexed by l is
lost. Consequently, 8 is satised.
Finally, for z < z3, given that z3 > z, the proof is similar to the one in Proposition 2,
provided that Assumption 3 holds.
A.5 Working out equation (8)
If F(z;n;k1;:::;kI) = zn0 QI
i=1 k
i







i   n  
I X
i=1














By taking the rst-order condition of (14) with respect to kI, which is chosen in the last







































where ~ i =
i















Proceeding iteratively, one reaches (8). Moreover, if z is either log-normally or Pareto
distributed, then  also is.
B Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I check the robustness of the empirical results obtained in Section 7 by
varying , , and o. In particular, I generate results for  equal to 4:13 and 2:49, which are
consistent with an average employment of four and ten, respectively. I also set  = 0:12 and
o = (1 )0:64, which is in line with the calibration by Kitao [2008] in another context.
Tables 5 and 6 report the results for repa = 0:43 and repa = 0:65, respectively. Notice
that the results are remarkably robust to variations of , but net revenue collected would
increase even more for higher values of .
53lower bound to Ro=Ra
 = 0:2 and 0 = (1   )  0:6  = 0:12 and 0 = (1   )  0:64
 repo   = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15 repo   = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15
0.15 0.91 1.94 1.83 1.73 0.92 1.98 1.86 1.76
 = 0.20 0.88 1.86 1.75 1.66 0.90 1.90 1.79 1.69
4:13 0.25 0.86 1.78 1.68 1.58 0.87 1.83 1.72 1.63
0.30 0.83 1.70 1.60 1.51 0.85 1.75 1.65 1.56
0.15 0.91 1.95 1.83 1.73 0.92 1.98 1.86 1.76
 = 0.20 0.88 1.87 1.76 1.66 0.90 1.91 1.80 1.70
3:07 0.25 0.86 1.79 1.68 1.59 0.88 1.84 1.73 1.63
0.30 0.83 1.71 1.61 1.52 0.86 1.76 1.66 1.57
0.15 0.91 1.95 1.83 1.73 0.92 1.98 1.86 1.76
 = 0.20 0.88 1.87 1.76 1.66 0.90 1.91 1.80 1.70
2:49 0.25 0.86 1.79 1.68 1.59 0.88 1.84 1.73 1.64
0.30 0.83 1.71 1.61 1.52 0.86 1.77 1.67 1.57
Table 5: Results for repa = 0:43.
lower bound to Ro=Ra
 = 0:2 and 0 = (1   )  0:6  = 0:12 and 0 = (1   )  0:64
 repo   = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15 repo   = 0:05   = 0:10   = 0:15
0.15 0.91 1.34 1.30 1.27 0.92 1.36 1.32 1.29
 = 0.20 0.88 1.28 1.25 1.22 0.90 1.31 1.27 1.24
4:13 0.25 0.86 1.22 1.19 1.16 0.87 1.27 1.22 1.19
0.30 0.83 1.16 1.13 1.11 0.85 1.20 1.17 1.14
0.15 0.91 1.34 1.30 1.27 0.92 1.36 1.32 1.29
 = 0.20 0.88 1.28 1.25 1.22 0.90 1.31 1.28 1.24
3:07 0.25 0.86 1.23 1.20 1.17 0.88 1.26 1.23 1.20
0.30 0.83 1.17 1.14 1.11 0.86 1.21 1.18 1.15
0.15 0.91 1.34 1.30 1.27 0.92 1.36 1.32 1.29
 = 0.20 0.88 1.28 1.25 1.22 0.90 1.31 1.28 1.25
2:49 0.25 0.86 1.23 1.20 1.17 0.88 1.26 1.23 1.20
0.30 0.83 1.18 1.15 1.12 0.86 1.22 1.18 1.15
Table 6: Results for repa = 0:65.
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